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THE PROHIBITION AGAINST TORTURE AND
CRUEL, INHUMAN, AND DEGRADING
TREATMENT AND PUNISHMENT: CAN THE
ABSOLUTE BE RELATIVIZED UNDER EXISTING
INTERNATIONAL LAW?
Yuval Shany*
INTRODUCTION

Generally speaking, norms derived from international humanitarian

law (IHL) and international human rights law (IHR) strive to strike a
balance between the rights of the protected individual, the rights of other
individuals, and broader military or public interests. They do so, mainly,

through the introduction of explicit or implicit limitation and derogation
provisions that permit states to restrict or even suspend the legal entitlements normally afforded to individuals during times of conflict or public

emergency, or through other situations of pressing social necessity. Still,
some IHL and IHR norms have been formulated as absolute prescrip-

tions-i.e., strict rules that should be applied under all circumstances
(sometimes referred to as jus strictum).' IHL norms such as the prohibitions against the use of certain means of warfare, collective punishments,
and perfidy contain such inflexible attributes.2 The prohibition against
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University. The research was conducted with the support of The Catholic University of
America.
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Enoch, Dr. Leonard Hammer, Mr. Noam Lubell, Mr. Daniel Reisner, and Mr. David
Scharia for their support, criticism and words of advice. Thanks are also due my research
assistants, Ms. Nitzan Arad and Mr. Gil Limon. Of course, responsibility for the positions
expressed herein and for any errors remains exclusively mine.
1. See, e.g., David Kretzmer, The Advisory Opinion: The Light Treatment of International HumanitarianLaw, 99 AM. J. INT'L L. 88, 88 (2005). Classic international law literature uses the term jus strictum somewhat differently, however, as a principle of interpretation. GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, A MANUAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 29 (5th ed.
1967) (juxtaposing strict construction of the law-jus strictum-against more flexible and
equitable rules ofjus aequum).
2. See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War art. 33, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva
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torture, which can be found in both IHL and IHR instruments,3 is also
drafted in absolute terms.
The present Article reviews the theoretical underpinnings of the absolute international law prohibition against torture in light of the general
rationales that may explain resorting to absolute prescriptions in IHL and
IHR instruments. It also examines the scope of the prohibition against
torture under international law, as it presently stands, and the degree of
absoluteness it actually entails. Significantly, the Article does not challenge or seek to revisit most internationally accepted definitions of "torture" and "other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment., 4 Instead, it asks whether a distinction between the different
degrees of prohibited ill-treatment -i.e., between torture, as defined by
Article 1 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman
or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)5 and other, less severe
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment prohibited by Article 7
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) 6 and
IV]; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land arts. 23, 50, July
29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803, 1 Bevans 247 [hereinafter Hague Regulations].
3. See Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment art. 2, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOc. No. 100-20 (1988), 1465
U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT]; Geneva IV, supra note 2, arts. 3(1), 32; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War arts. 3(1), 17, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,
75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva III].
4. CAT, supra note 3, art. 16.
5. Article 1 of CAT defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally
inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person,
or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is
inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
Id. art. 1(1).
6. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 7, Dec. 19, 1966, S. EXEC.
Doc. E, 95-2 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR] ("No one shall be subjected to
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. In particular, no one
shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific experimentation.").
Notably, the European Court of Human Rights has discussed in a number of cases the
meaning of the parallel term "inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment" found in
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 3,
Nov. 4, 1950,213 U.N.T.S. 222 [hereinafter ECHR]. The court held:
[I]ll-treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope
of Article 3. The assessment of this minimum is ... relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical or mental
effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim ....
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978). Specifically, the court
held that treatment that "was premeditated, was applied for hours at a stretch and caused
either actual bodily injury or intense physical or mental suffering" amounted to "inhuman
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Article 16 of CATT-might have legal significance for the possibility of
invoking ex post defenses against the attribution of legal responsibility.
While the distinction between the two degrees of illegality might be distasteful and difficult to apply,8 it is generally supported in international
legal texts and case law.
treatment." Kudla v. Poland, 2000-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 199, 223. Furthermore, the court held
that treatment, which aroused in the victims "feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them," amounted to "degrading treatment." Ireland, 25
Eur. Ct. H.R. at 66-67; see also Kalashnikov v. Russia, 2002-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 93, 116; Kudla,
2000-XI Eur. Ct. at 223; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 39 (1989).
Although the question whether the authorities intended to cause such injury, suffering, or
humiliation is important in evaluating the severity of the treatment, it is by no means determinative (i.e., nondeliberate ill-treatment might qualify as "inhuman or degrading treatment"). See Peers v. Greece, 2001-111 Eur. Ct. H.R. 277,297; Raninen v. Finland, 1997-VIII
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2805, 2821-22.
Indirect mental injury suffered by relatives of victims of ill-treatment might also fall
under Article 3 of the ECHR. See, e.g., Imakayeva v. Russia, App. No. 7615/02, paras.
166-67 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 9, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkpl97/search.asp?skin
=hudoc-en (search "Application Number" for "7615/02"); Bazorkina v. Russia, App. No.
69481/01, paras. 139-42 (Eur. Ct. H.R. July 27, 2006), http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/
tkpl97/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en (search "Application Number" for "69481/01"); see also
CLARE OVEY & ROBIN C.A. WHITE, JACOBS AND WHITE, EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON
HUMAN RIGHTS 58-66 (3d ed. 2002); Fionnuala Ni Aoldin, The European Convention on
Human Rights and its Prohibitionon Torture, in TORTURE 213, 214-18 (Sanford Levinson
ed., 2004).
It may also be noted that at least one prominent expert on the law governing torture
objects to the distinction between torture and other forms of ill-treatment on the basis of
the severity of the ill-treatment, and argues that deliberate intent to inflict pain or suffering
should be the dividing criterion. NIGEL S. RODLEY, THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS
UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 50 (2d ed. 1999).
For a definition of the prohibition against torture under IHL, see 3 COMMENTARY ON
THE GENEVA CONVENTION RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS OF WAR 627
(Jean S. Pictet ed., 1960) ("The word torture refers here especially to the infliction of suffering on a person in order to obtain from that person, or from another person, confessions or
information.... [Inhuman treatment] could not mean, it seems, solely treatment constituting an attack on physical integrity or health; the aim of the Convention is certainly to grant
prisoners of war in enemy hands a protection which will preserve their human dignity and
prevent their being brought down to the level of animals. Certain measures, for example,
which might cut prisoners of war off completely from the outside world and in particular
from their families, or which would cause great injury to their human dignity, should be
considered as inhuman treatment .....
7. CAT provides:
Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not
amount to torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity.
CAT, supra note 3, art. 16(1).
8. Eyal Benvenisti, The Role of National Courts in Preventing Torture of Suspected
Terrorists, 8 EUR. J. INT'L L. 596, 606 (1997); Oren Gross, Are Torture Warrants Warranted? Pragmatic Absolutism and Official Disobedience, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1481, 1488
(2004) (criticizing the "definitional juggling" that the two-level definition facilitates).
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To be clear, the present author supports the absolute ban against torture as defined in Article 1 of CAT, as a matter of law, morality, and
sound policy. Still, I posit that the sweeping extension of the absolute
prohibition ban to all proscribed forms of ill-treatment falling short of
torture is unsupported by lex lata. Furthermore, such extension is morally controversial, politically unfeasible, and perhaps also counterproductive from a pragmatic pro-human rights perspective. Thus, a host of considerations support the introduction of a limited degree of flexibility into
the penumbral prohibition against ill-treatment falling short of torture.
As a result, the Article proposes to construe the existing legal regime
governing proscribed torture and other forms of ill-treatment as comprising an absolute core prohibition against torture and a relative prohibition
against other forms of ill-treatment, while allowing the criminal law defenses, such as duress, necessity, or self-defense to be available in exceptional circumstances to perpetrators of such ill-treatment.
Part One of this Article explains the policy rationales underlying the introduction of absolute norms in IHL and IHR and applies them, in a
critical manner, to the prohibition against torture. I contend that while
the moral case for the introduction of an absolute prohibition against
torture might be unsubstantiated, the policy choice underlying the introduction of an absolute bar is legitimate given the second-order deficiencies associated with monitoring relative prohibitions. Part Two explores
two potential exceptions to the absolute nature of the prohibition against
forms of ill-treatment falling short of the definition of torture--the availability of general defenses under the international law of state responsibility and general defenses under criminal law. While I reject the first
group of defenses, since they are incompatible with existing law and the
policy rationales underlying the prohibition against torture, I accept, to
some degree, the position taken by the Israeli Supreme Court in its landmark 1999 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v. Israel decision to
retroactively examine the permissibility of harsh terror-related interrogation techniques in the framework of criminal law defenses.9 Part Three
concludes.
I. ABSOLUTE PRESCRIPTIONS AND THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
TORTURE
IHL and IHR law often strike a delicate balance between the protection of individual rights on the one hand, and protection of the rights of
other individuals and military or community interests on the other hand.
Many IHL and IHR rights perform this balancing act through the introduction of relative legal standards, which explicitly or implicitly facilitate
9. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1488 (1999).
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the adaptation of humanitarian norms to varying circumstances. 0 For
example, under IHL, private property is not to be destroyed in times of
conflict, "except where such destruction is rendered absolutely necessary
by military operations";" the personal rights of protected persons are to
be respected, subject to the proviso that "the Parties to the conflict may
take such measures of control and security in regard to protected persons
as may be necessary as a result of the war";' 2 and military attacks that
result in collateral civilian damage are permissible unless they are "expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, damage
to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in
relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated."' 3
Similarly, many IHR rights can be limited, subject to conditions such as
necessity, proportionality, non-arbitrariness, resource availability, and
the like.' 4 In addition, derogation clauses in human rights treaties permit
states to suspend many human rights protections in times of emergency,
subject to a number of requirements. 5
10. On the related distinction between "rules" and "standards" in law, see Duncan
Kennedy, Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1685
(1976). For application of the same distinction in international law, see Yuval Shany, Toward a General Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in InternationalLaw?, 16 EUR. J. INT'L L.
907 (2005).
11. Geneva IV, supra note 2, art. 53.
12. Id. art. 27.
13. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 57(2)(a)(iii),
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Protocol I].
14. See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 6 (prohibiting the arbitrary deprivation of life);
id. art. 9 (prohibiting arbitrary arrests and detentions); id. art. 12(3) (allowing necessary
limitations on freedom of movement); id. art. 17 (prohibiting arbitrary interference with
privacy); id. art. 18(3) (permitting necessary limitations on freedom of religion); id. art.
19(3) (allowing necessary limitations on freedom of expression); id. art. 21 (permitting
necessary limitations on freedom of assembly); id. art. 22(2) (allowing for necessary limitations on freedom of association); id. art. 25 (providing that no unreasonable restrictions are
to be placed on the right to take part in public affairs); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 2(1), Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter
ICESCR] ("Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps ... to the
maximum of its available resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant ....).
15. See ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 4 ("In time of public emergency which threatens the
life of the nation and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States Parties to
the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their obligations under the
present Covenant to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under international law
and do not involve discrimination .... No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs 1

and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18 may be made under this provision."). For an authoritative interpretation of Article 4, see generally United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General
Comment 29: States of Emergency (Article 4), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 (Aug.
31, 2001). For comparable derogation provisions in other human rights instruments, see
Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 27, Nov.
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The relative nature of these IHL and IHR obligations provides states
with considerable discretion in choosing how to apply the primary humanitarian norm in question. Such flexibility conforms to the general
philosophy
of the "human
natue
o humn
16 rights movement, which supports the relative
nature of human rights, as well as with the laws of state responsibility,
which provide exceptions to liability in special circumstances. 17 Additionally, this flexibility is manifested in international criminal law, which
recognizes a number of general defenses 8 against criminal responsibility
applicable in extraordinary circumstances.
However, a significant number of IHL norms and one notable IHR
norm - the prohibition against torture - are formulated in absolute terms,
ostensibly allowing no room for limitation or nuanced application. 9 For
example, resort to certain conventional and unconventional weapons,
such as chemical and biological weapons, has been outlawed under all
circumstances;' ° certain war tactics, labeled as perfidious (e.g., feigning
injury or surrender), ought never to be resorted to;21 and collective pun-

ishments can never be meted out against a protected civilian population. 22
The prohibition against torture, under both IHL and IHR law, also seems
to fall within this category of absolute prescriptions.2
22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 [hereinafter I/A CHR]; ECHR, supra note

6, art. 15.
16. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights art. 29, G.A. Res. 217A, at 71, U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948).
17. See, e.g., United Nations, Int'l Law Comm'n, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts with Commentaries art. 25, in Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, U.N. Doc. A/56/10
[hereinafter Draft Articles].
18. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 31(1), July 17,

1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Rome Statute].
19. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 65 (1978).
20. See, e.g., Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and
Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on their Destruction art. 1, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056
U.N.T.S. 211; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling
and Use of Chemical Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, Jan. 13, 1993, 32 I.L.M.
800; Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of

Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction art. 1, Apr. 10,
1972, 26 U.S.T. 583, 1015 U.N.T.S. 163.

21. See Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 37; Hague Regulations, supra note 2, art. 23.
The prohibition is well-established in customary IHL as well. 1 JEAN-MARIE
HENCKAERTS

&

LOUISE

DOSWALD-BECK,

INT'L

COMM.

OF THE

RED CROSS,

CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 203-26 (2005).

22. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 75(2)(d); Geneva IV, supra note 2, art. 33; Hague
Regulations, supra note 2, art. 50.
23. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment,
153-56
(Dec. 10, 1998). It may be noted, however, that the prohibition against torturing enemy
civilians present "in the territory of a [p]arty to the conflict" might be subject to a general
limitation clause found in Geneva IV. See Geneva IV, supra note 2, art. 5. Still, it would
seem that customary international law, which incorporates the prohibition against torture,
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PossibleExplanationfor Selecting Strict IHL or IHR Rules
How is one to understand this choice of legislative methodology, which
denies the relative nature of the covered humanitarian norms (i.e., their
circumstance dependent character)? Why should a norm be decontextualized from the background conditions in which it is expected to operate?
Three principal explanations, which may apply cumulatively or alternatively to different absolute prohibitions, come to mind.
First, a moral-oriented "inherent repugnance" argument would suggest
that some acts are inherently immoral or would certainly be incompatible
with fundamental human rights or basic notions of justice or fairness. 24
As a result, such acts should be avoided at all costs and can never be justified regardless of the relevant stakes. So, the argument goes, the monstrous effects of biological or chemical weapons, the deception and
breach of trust associated with perfidy, and the violation of basic moral
percepts of individual guilt generated by collective punishment measures,
support an absolute bar against their application regardless of any conjectural benefits that might accrue to the relevant actor from evading absolute prohibitions in specific situations (e.g., winning the war, deterring the
enemy, or preventing harm to other individuals).
Applied to the prohibition against torture, the immorality argument
would posit that torture is inherently evil-it is barbaric, corruptive, and
incompatible with basic notions of respect for human dignity. In particular, it conflicts with the Kantian percept that individuals should never be
used as mere means to an end 5 According to this principle, the objectification of individuals subject to torture-i.e., the willingness to sacrifice
their fundamental rights in order to promote the rights of others or some
broader public goal (for instance, fighting terror, solving crime, obtaining
military intelligence, and deterring enemies) - amounts to dehumanization of torture victims and must be viewed as inherently immoral. Hence,
see, for example, Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, 1$ 153-56, as well as the parallel
application of the relevant nonderogable provisions of IHR would negate any effects that
Article 5 could have had with regard to the prohibition against torture. See, e.g., supra
notes 19-22 and accompanying text.
24. See Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L.
239, 242 (2000) ("[G]overnments have agreed to the absolute prohibition of weapons considered inherently abhorrent .... "); Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional
Right: A JurisprudentialBased Inquiry into Criteria and Content, 27 HOw. L.J. 145, 192
n.206 (1984) ("[A]ny form of collective punishment would violate the right of individuals
to human dignity.... ").
25.

IMMANUEL KANT, Metaphysical Foundationsof Morals, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF

KANT 154, 195 (Carl J. Friedrich ed., 1993); see also Alan Gewirth, Are There Any Absolute Rights?, 31 PHIL. Q. 1, 9 (1981); Mordechai Kremnitzer, The Landau Commission
Report- Was the Security Service Subordinatedto the Law or the Law to the "Needs" of the
Security Service?, 23 ISR. L. REv. 216, 248-53 (1989); Patrick Lee, InterrogationalTorture,
51 AM. J. JURIS. 131 (2006).
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it should be barred in all circumstances. Indeed, judicial cases in which
various manifestations of torture had been barred often cite the incompatibility of torture with fundamental notions of human dignity and other
moral considerations of this type. 6
A second argument in favor of resorting to absolute norms is based on
second-order institutional considerations. Since IHL and, to a somewhat
lesser degree, IHR law are applied in the absence of effective judicial
review, states often enjoy, in practice, an unchallenged power of discretion on the manner of applying relative norms. This state of affairs, in
which the "cats" are trusted with guarding the "cream," invites abuse, as
states are likely to overstress right-limiting factors and to underprotect
those individuals who were supposed to benefit from the norm (who are
often regarded as outlaws or the "enemy"). 27 Even in the absence of purposeful abuse, recognizing exceptions to a prohibition designed to protect
important human interests might create "slippery slope" conditions
through which application of the rules becomes the exception and not the
norm, and vice versa.2 In other words, the inclination of state institutions
to guard general societal interests, even at the expense of individual
rights, might lead to the misapplication of relative international legal
standards.
Hence, when devising a rule of IHL or IHR law, a policy choice is presented between (a) normative rigidity, which promotes the attainment of
the norm's goals in the vast majority of cases, at the price of an inadequate match between law and reality in extreme circumstances, in which
a different or nuanced application of the norm would have been warranted; and (b) normative flexibility, which is more attuned to changing
26. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 272-73 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring); HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1482-84 (1999); Pretty v. United Kingdom, 2002-11I Eur. Ct.
H.R. 157, 190-91; Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 34-35 (1989);
United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment 20: Article 7, para. 2 (1992), in
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRIGEN1\Rev.1 at 30 (July 29, 1994) [hereinafter General
Comment 20].
27. See Alan M. Dershowitz, Is It Necessary To Apply "Physical Pressure" to Terrorists-and To Lie About It?, 23 ISR. L. REV. 192, 199-200 (1989); Gross, supra note 8, at
1507 ("[Any balancing act is going to be factually difficult to conduct and subject to inherent biases that would result in more, rather than less, torture."). Gross also argues that
individual terrorist interrogators pressured to foil terror attacks might have an independent interest in undercomplying with the prohibition. Id. at 1509.
28. Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1021-22 (2003); Harold Hongju Koh, A World Without Torture, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 641, 654 (2005); cf. CARL SCHMITT, POLITICAL
THEOLOGY: FOUR CHAPTERS ON THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 11-13 (George
Schwab trans., MIT Press 1985) (1922); Oren Gross, The Normless and Exceptionless Exception: Carl Schmitt's Theory of Emergency Powers and the "Norm-Exception" Dichotomy, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 1825,1846 (2000).
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social needs and extreme situations but would be chronically underenforced. Hence, pragmatic considerations of an institutional nature may
support absolute prohibitions against inhumane weapons, perfidy, or collective punishment, even if it were to be accepted that in some extraordinary circumstances, deviation from the norm could have been morally
justifiable. This is because the disadvantages associated with norm abuse
and noncompliance, which a relative prohibition would have entailed,
might far exceed the costs associated with the unsuitability of an absolute
norm to govern extreme cases (which might actually be very rare).
So, an absolute prohibition might be resorted to whenever (a) the possibility of effective institutional oversight over application of exceptions
to a rule is limited; (b) the values protected by a prohibition are deemed
important enough to assume the costs of excessive rigidity in exceptional
cases; and (c) the incidence of exceptional situations, which could justify
derogation from the norm, are improbable. While moral considerations
are important in this balance of considerations, their influence is moderated by pragmatic concerns of an institutional and statistical nature. In
all events, one should note that the policy dilemmas associated with the
choice between flexible or inflexible norm formulations are not unique to
IHL or IHR, but can also be identified in other areas of national and international law.3 °
A recent example demonstrating such a dilemma between the formulation of flexible or inflexible IHL standards can be found in the human
shields case decided by the Israeli Supreme Court in June 2005. 3' The
case involved a challenge to the lawfulness of Israel Defense Forces
(IDF) guidelines that allowed military units conducting arrests of suspected terrorists in the West Bank to seek and obtain assistance from
29. See Gross, supra note 8, at 1501-02 ("While catastrophic cases are not just hypothetical scenarios conjured up in academic ivory towers, they are extremely rare in practice.").
30. For example, evidentiary rules barring hearsay and the jus ad bellum prohibition
on preventive self-defense in international law are also premised upon the fear that flexible standards might lead to abuse. See, e.g., Michael L. Seigel, RationalizingHearsay: A
Proposalfor a Best Evidence Hearsay Rule, 72 B.U. L. REv. 893, 903-08 (1992) (stating
that the hearsay rule's "ability to prejudice the jury outweighs its probative content");
Miriam Sapiro, PreemptingPrevention:Lessons Learned,37 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 357,
367 (2005) ("The further a decision to use force moves away from the requirement of imminence, the more likely the possibility of a mistake."). Here too, second-order institutional considerations seem to be decisive, as the delegation of decision-making power to
more competent organs (from lay jury to professional judges; from individual states to the
UN Security Council), might justify the introduction of greater flexibility in the application
of the relevant standard (i.e., according hearsay some probative value or authorizing preventive self-defense measures conducive to the maintenance of international peace and
security).
31. HCJ 3799/02 Adalah-The Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. GOC
Cent. Command, IDF [2005] IsrSC 56(5) 393, reprintedin 45 I.L.M. 491,491 (2006).
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local Palestinians in the course of these arrest operations." According to
the guidelines, officially dubbed the "'early warning' procedure," Palestinian civilians present in proximity to potential hideouts where suspected
militants were hiding could be utilized to approach the premises in question and to try and convince the suspects to turn themselves in to the Israeli authorities and evacuate any uninvolved civilians from the scene."
The IDF maintained that there was increased likelihood that the situation
could be peacefully defused and lives may be saved if the persuasive
powers of Palestinian neighbors, who may be personally acquainted with
the suspects in question, were to be employed. 34 A military break-in into
the premises or the use of other forceful methods to overpower the suspect should be employed only when all nonviolent alternatives had
failed.35 Significantly, the reviewed guidelines provided that Palestinian
civilians can never be coerced into assisting the IDF; nor can they be utilized in circumstances that are likely to endanger their lives.36
All three judges on the bench-President Barak, Vice President
Cheshin, and Justice Beinisch-were unanimous in declaring the IDF's
guidelines to be incompatible with certain basic international humanitarian law principles (especially the principle of distinction and the nonrenounceable nature of the rights afforded to protected persons).37 Still, in
her concurring opinion, Justice Beinisch added the following observation,
which has particular relevance for the topic at hand:
As it turns out, there are deviations from the procedure in the
field; nor does the use made of local residents for "early warning"
remain within the restrictions set out in the procedure .... The
daily reality in the field is difficult. The conditions set out in the
procedure, aside from being faulty in and of themselves, allow a
slide down the slippery slope, which causes stark violations of the
rules of international law, and of the constitutional principles of
our legal system. The army must do all in its power to prevent
the possibility that a detailed and official procedure will create
gaps which will lead to a deterioration of the operations in the

32. Id. at 491-92.
33. Id. at 492-93.
34. Id. at 493,496.
35. See id. at 496.
36. Id. at 493-94.
37. Id. at 498-99. President Barak laid out in his opinion the main reasons for finding
the procedure unlawful: (a) it conflicts with the prohibition against compelling protected
persons to take part in military operations; (b) it conflicts with the principle of distinction;
(c) any consent given by local Palestinians is unlikely to be free and genuine; and (d) appreciating the level of threat posed to the assisting Palestinian during or after the raid is
extremely difficult. Id at 498.
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field to unequivocal situations of illegality. The procedure contains such a gap, and thus must be annulled.38
In other words, fears that the flexible elements introduced by the reviewed guidelines would be abused by military personnel led Justice Beinisch to strike down the guidelines in their entirety. Instead, the court
opted for an absolute standard of conduct, which prohibits IDF soldiers
from seeking any form of assistance from Palestinian civilians in the
course of military arrest operations.39
The Israeli experience of using harsh interrogation tactics against suspected terrorists provides further support for the application of the
aforementioned institutional considerations with relation to the prohibition against torture. Indeed, it has been widely reported in and outside
Israel that the 1987 Landau Commission criteria for permitting the use of
"moderate measure of physical pressure" by the General Security Service
(GSS) in exceptional "ticking time bomb" circumstances ° had been
commonly abused, with physical pressure being routinely applied vis-Avis Palestinian terror suspects.4 1 The perception that the relative legal
regime sanctioned de facto by the Landau Commission considerably
eroded the prohibition against torture in GSS interrogations appears to
have led the Supreme Court of Israel to emphasize in its 1999 Public
Committee Against Torture decision the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture. 2
A third explanation for the absolute nature of some IHL norms, which
overlaps to some degree with the second explanation, relates to the principle of reciprocity in the laws of war. In the past, reciprocity -that is,
adherence to a similar set of limitations on warfare-used to be a key
factor in ensuring compliance with IHL and in promoting its humanitarian objects through the introduction of mutually beneficial damage control measures. Although reduced in its significance under modern IHL
(violations by one party of its IHR obligations do not normally permit

38.

Id. at 502 (Beinisch, J., concurring).

39. Id. at 499 (opinion of the court).
40. REPORT OF THE COMMISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE METHODS OF
INVESTIGATION OF THE GENERAL SECURITY SERVICE REGARDING HOSTILE
TERRORIST ACTIVITY (1987), reprinted in 23 ISR. L. REV. 146, 174, 184-85 (1989).
41. See, e.g., Amnesty Int'l, News Release, Israel: High Court Should End the Shame
of Torture (Jan. 12, 1999), http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engmde150051999;
B'TSELEM, ROUTING TORTURE: INTERROGATION METHODS OF THE GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE 5-6 (1998).
42. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
reprintedin 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1481-82 (1999). An explicit position on this point was taken by
the UN Committee against Torture. See United Nations, Comm. Against Torture, Report
of the Committee Against Torture, para. 168(a), U.N. Doc. A/49/44 (July 12, 1994).
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under modern IHL reciprocal breaches by the other party), 43 reciprocity
still plays a valuable role in legitimizing IHL, and in motivating parties to
adhere to its prescriptions. Furthermore, reciprocity also has long-term
reputational implications: given the iterative nature of international conflicts, the reputation of being a norm compliant or a norm violator, which
may ascribe to a specific party in one conflict, might shape the attitude
towards it by the parties to subsequent conflicts.
Arguably, pragmatic considerations, not dissimilar to the ones noted
above, support the resort to absolute rules in armed conflict situations
governed by the principle of reciprocity. This is because absolute prohibitions minimize the room for abuse, or the perceived abuse of legal
rules, while relative standards of conduct, which allow the withdrawal of
humanitarian protections at the discretion of the fighting parties, might
generate "prisoner dilemma"-type defection dynamics and, hence, gradually erode the parties' commitment to apply IHL norms. 44 Arguably, the
designation of certain weapons or fighting tactics as off-limits for all parties, under all circumstances, restricts the potential for "defection" from
the norm, by way of mutual misapplication, and facilitates the introduction of humanitarian protections, while preserving the formal and perceived equality of arms between the parties to the conflict. 45
Indeed, examination of the dynamics leading to the aerial bombardment campaigns of heavily populated cities during World War II suggests
that the reciprocal application of flexible standards might lead to a vicious cycle of violations. The perceived abuse of the principle of necessity in targeting military objects inside Britain by the Luftwaffe (caused in
some cases by navigational errors), led the Royal Air Force to adopt a
retaliatory policy of bombing German civilian targets, which was accompanied by a flexible construction of the necessity principle." This even-

43. See Prosecutor v. Kupreskic, Case No. IT-95-16-T, Judgment,
515-20 (Jan. 14,
2000). The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICrY) noted
some additional reasons for its refusal to accept a tu quoque defense-lack of support to
this defense in state practice and the text of IHL instruments; its incompatibility with
moral principles requiring the protection of individuals; and the conflict it creates with jus
cogens norms. Id $ 516,518,520.
44. See Eric A. Posner, Terrorism and the Laws of War, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 423, 427-28

(2005).
45. Reciprocal renunciation of specific weapons or fighting tactic reminisces, in some
respects, "fair play" restrictions applying to medieval dueling contests, which informed the
development of many IHL norms. See, e.g., William Bradford, Barbariansat the Gates: A
Post-September 11th Proposal to Rationalize the Laws of War, 73 MiSS. L.J. 639, 688-90

(2004).
46. D.H.N. JOHNSON, RIGHTS IN AIR SPACE 47-48 (1965); WILLIAM L. SHIRER, THE
RISE AND FALL OF THE THIRD REICH: A HISTORY OF NAZI GERMANY 777-78 (1990);

Nathan A. Canestaro, Legal and Policy Constraints on the Conduct of Aerial Precision
Warfare, 37 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431, 444-45 (2004). On the "slippery slope" risk in
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tually led, in effect, to obliteration of the protection that the principle
should have afforded to civilians from air bombings throughout the war.
At the same time, it is interesting to note that some absolute rules, such
as the prohibition against the use of chemical weapons in military operations, had been generally preserved throughout that war. 7 While this
anecdotal comparison does not suggest that the resort to absolute norms
serves as a panacea for the underenforcement of IHL, it is proposed that
stricter and clearer standards could induce better compliance. 8
Applied to the IHL prohibition against torture, the reciprocity rationale would justify protecting the humanitarian interests of all prisoners of
war and civilian detainees, through reference to the renunciation of coercive interrogation techniques by all parties to the conflict. Hence, no
military advantage is surrendered because of reciprocal compliance with
the prohibition; to the contrary, refraining from the mistreatment of enemy prisoners improves the chances that comparable protections would
be afforded to the abstaining party's soldiers 49 and this may, in turn, reduce these soldiers' concerns about being captured as the result of participating in battle. The reciprocity rationale probably explains the extraordinary breadth of the prohibition against ill-treatment found in Geneva III--not only is the torture of POWs prohibited, but also other
forms of pressure to cooperate with the interrogation process.50
The reciprocity rationale is inapplicable, however, with relation to the
parallel IHR prohibition on torture, which, like other human rights, was
not designed to apply in a reciprocal manner. This difference between
IHR and IHL perhaps best explains why absolute standards were rather
frequently employed in IHL instruments, which apply reciprocally to all
parties to the conflict, while they were almost never used in IHR instruments, which are nonreciprocal by nature."

the area of aerial bombardment, see FRITS KALSHOVEN, THE LAW OF WARFARE 38-39
(1973).
47. See, e.g., George H. Aldrich & Christine M. Chinkin, A Century of Achievement
and Unfinished Work, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 90,93 (2000).
48. See Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the InternationalSystem, 82 AM. J. INT'L L.
705,713-25 (1988).
49. See Koh, supra note 28, at 659 ("[Tlhe more we tolerate torture, the more we
leave the door open for American soldiers to be tortured by foreign captors.").
50. Geneva III, supra note 3, art. 17 ("Prisoners of war who refuse to answer may not
be threatened, insulted, or exposed to unpleasant or disadvantageous treatment of any
kind."); cf YORAM DINSTEIN, THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICr 24-25 (2004) (explaining the wider protection in IHL
by way of allusion to the special vulnerability of protected persons in times of an armed
conflict).
51. Cf Reservations to Convention on Prevention and Punishment of Crime of
Genocide, Advisory Opinion, 1951 I.C.J. 15, 23 (May 28). A similar principle can be found
in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. See Vienna Convention on the Law of
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CriticallyAssessing the Absolute ProhibitionAgainst Torture
The previous section provided some possible explanations for the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture: torture might be inherently
immoral; and a relative prohibition would most probably be abused and
lead to a reciprocal cycle of violations. The present section will critically
assess these explanatiorls and discuss the implications of such critical
analysis for determining the desirable scope of the current absolute prohibition against torture.
The moral case against torture has been widely discussed in the literature.2 While the general impermissibility of torture is hardly ever contested, several philosophers have pointed out that it is difficult, if not impossible, to develop a cogent moral argument which would completely
decontextualize the evils associated with torture from the evils it seeks to
prevent. 3 Hence, when faced with the need to prevent a catastrophe of
major proportions, the moral case against torture might be unsustainable. Others have also noted the potential moral blameworthiness of
the interrogated terror suspect as an additional factor that might tilt the
balance, in some cases, in favor of acts of torture conducive to the protection of innocent bystanders.5
It is beyond the ambition of the present paper to revisit the host of
moral arguments for and against an absolute prohibition of torture. 6
Still, the inconclusive nature of the moral debate, and the ensuing unlikeTreaties art. 60(5), opened for signature May 23, 1969, S. EXEC. DOc. L, 92-1 (1970), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331.
52. See generally Dershowitz, supra note 27; Gross, supra note 8; Mordechai Kremnitzer & Re'em Segev, The Legality of InterrogationalTorture: A Question of ProperAuthorization or a Substantive Moral Issue?, 34 ISR. L. REV. 509 (2000); Michael S. Moore,
Torture and the Balance of Evils, 23 ISR. L. REV. 280 (1989).
53. For a survey of many of the positions raised in the relevant philosophical literature, see Adam Raviv, Torture and Justification: Defending the Indefensible, 13 GEO.
MASON L. REV. 135, 139-47 (2004).
54. Gross, supranote 8, at 1495.
55. See, e.g., ALAN M. DERSHOWITZ, WHY TERRORISM WORKS: UNDERSTANDING
THE THREAT, RESPONDING TO THE CHALLENGE 144 (2002); Mirko Bagaric & Julie

Clarke, Not Enough Official Torture in the World? The Circumstancesin Which Torture Is
Morally Justifiable,39 U.S.F. L. REv. 581, 612-13 (2005); Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 601;
Winfried Brugger, May Government Ever Use Torture? Two Responses from German Law,
48 AM. J. COMP. L. 661, 676 (2000); Jeff McMahan, Torture, Morality, and the Law, 37

CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 241,244 (2006).
56. Still, it is questionable, to my mind, whether an absolute bar against all forms of
prohibited ill-treatment (including sleep deprivation, sensory disorientation, and the like)
morally coheres with the lack of a similar bar against deprivation of life and other fundamental human rights. For example, Article 6 of ICCPR only prohibits arbitrary deprivation of life. ICCPR, supra note 6, art. 6. This has been understood to confirm the permissibility of deprivation of life in certain exceptional circumstances such as war or law enforcement. See, e.g., Legality of Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion,
1996 I.C.J. 226, 240 (July 8).
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lihood of identifying a political consensus that endorses an absolutist
moral stance, probably suggests that second-order institutional considerations provide a more convincing explanation for the choice of an absolute
prohibition by international lawmakers. In particular, it is difficult to
accept that the lawmakers took an absolute deontologist stance on torture, while at the same time applying a relative consequentalist stance on
issues no less morally challenging such as the ability to kill or injure uninvolved civilians as "collateral damage" in attacks against legitimate military objectives.
Thus, the decision to opt, in international law, for an absolute prohibition against torture can ultimately be viewed as a legitimate political decision,57 designed to promote the maximum attainment, on the balance, of
moral and policy goals, leading to the protection of the utmost number of
persons in the vast majority of circumstances. While moral considerations-i.e., the repugnance of torture-were most likely influential in the
choice of a strict legal regime that would create conditions inhospitable to
abusive deviation from the prohibition and to the creation of "slippery
58
slope" dynamics, it is questionable whether the norm drafters were exclusively, or even primarily, guided by a categorical moral imperative.
Recognition of the dominance of the institutional considerations that
underlie the absolute prohibition against torture has concrete normative
consequences for the project of delineating by way of interpretation the
scope of the current absolute prohibition. There seems to be no a priori
imperative that calls for the extension of the norm's absolute features
beyond the plain text of the relevant instruments (mainly, Geneva III,
Geneva IV, ICCPR, and CAT), which reflect the scope of political
agreement reached by the norm drafters. Thus, the interplay between
the prohibition and legal defenses or exceptions to legal responsibility,
which might introduce some degree of relativity into its application, constitutes a legitimate subject for norm interpretation projects (bearing in
mind, of course, the entire gamut of moral and policy reasons for introducing absolute norms in the first place). These interpretive alternatives
will be explored in Part Two of this Article.
Furthermore, one could make several observations on the limits of the
institutional arguments that support introducing an absolute prohibition
against torture. These observations may also have implications on the
57. Cf. Margaret MacDonald, NaturalRights, in THEORIES OF RIGHTS 21, 35 (Jeremy
Waldron ed., 1984) ("[Vlalue utterances are more like records of decisions." (emphasis
omitted)); McMahan, supra note 55, at 247.
58. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 8, at 1508-09 ("[A]ssuming that torture may be deemed
a more effective interrogation technique than its alternatives, we can expect members of
security services to become increasingly more dependent on the use of such coercive techniques in specific cases, justifying categorization of a larger number of cases as catastrophic."); Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 601-02.
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proper interpretation of the scope of the prohibition, and for evaluating
possible normative reform projects, which might be undertaken in the
future.
First, from a second-order institutional perspective, one may acknowledge that absolute rules might indeed be unsuitable to govern extreme
cases. Had extreme cases been viewed in isolation from non-extreme
cases, institutionalists would probably adopt agnostic or consequentialist
positions with relation to the choice between relative or absolute standards. 9 Indeed, states' principal reasons for supporting a broad absolute
ban covering both ordinary and extreme cases are the low probabilities of
catastrophic occurrences and the absence of a credible monitoring
mechanism to prevent abuse of the distinction between the two groups of
cases.
If extraordinary circumstances ceased to become rare (or, in other
words, extraordinary), institutionalists might need to reassess their support of a sweeping absolute ban. This is because the trade-off between
the better prospects of enforcing the core prohibition that absolute standards facilitate and the costs of not deviating from the norm in exceptional cases might become unsustainable under such conditions. In the
same vein, the introduction of an effective review mechanism, which
would ensure the proper application of exceptions to the rule, might convince institutionalists to accept some degree of flexibility into the prohibition against torture. The compatibility of some possible monitoring
mechanisms-Alan Dershowitz's proposed "torture warrants," 6 the empowerment of the head of the executive to authorize ill-treatment, 6 1 and
Israel's judicial practice of offering ex post exoneration from criminal
responsibility 62-with these policy concerns will be examined in Part Two
of this Article. 63
59.

See Warren P. Strobel & Jonathan S. Landay, Experts Reject Use of Torture,
Nov. 11, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR 18239507 (citing Senator
McCain, who advocates an absolute prohibition against torture, as referring to the "'ticking time bomb' scenario" in the following terms: "'It's a one-in-a-million issue, and if
something was a one-in-a-million situation, I would support whatever needs to be done.
But that's a one-in-a-million situation."'); see also Henry Shue, Torture in Dreamland:
Disposingof the Ticking Bomb, 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 231,231-32 (2006).
60. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 55, at 156-63.
61. PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N. KAYYEM, LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY
WICHITA EAGLE,

PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOcRATIc FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON

TERRORISM 5 (2004), availableat http:/lbcsia.ksg.harvard.edu/BCSIAcontent/documents/
LTLSfinal_5_3_05.pdf.
62. See HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4)
817, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1485 (1999).
63. International monitoring might also be considered. See, e.g., European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment
art. 1, Nov. 26, 1987, Europ. T.S. No. 126; CAT, supra note 3, art. 20; Optional Protocol to
the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
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A second observation is that the force of the second-order institutional
considerations supporting an absolute ban on torture stands in direct opposition to the degree of variance from the core prescription: the further
one is removed from the core prohibition against torture (e.g., if an illtreatment measure falling short of torture, such as subjecting an interrogated person to sensory disorientation or moderate food manipulation, is
applied), the weaker is the policy rationale for applying an absolute prohibition. This is because the number of scenarios in which the application
of these nasty, yet less harmful, interrogation techniques could be justified from a consequentialist or relativist perspective, on the balance, is
larger; and, as a result, the potential for abuse -application of these techniques in inappropriate circumstances -is smaller. Furthermore, the
relatively small harm to humanitarian interests caused by ill-treatment
falling short of torture might render the utilitarian trade-off underlying
the absolute prohibition -better enforcement at the price of poor suitability in extreme cases-more controversial. Hence, policy considerations might support the proposition that the absolute bar against torture
should not necessarily carry over to less severe forms of cruel, inhuman,
or degrading punishment and treatment prohibited by international law.
Moving on to the reciprocity rationale, which linked the choice of absolute standards to the facilitation of mutually applicable IHL standards, it
was already noted that this rationale cannot explain the IHR prohibition
against torture, because of the nonreciprocal nature of human rights
law.6 Furthermore, even in situations governed by IHL, the applicability
of the reciprocity rationale is becoming more and more limited. This is
so, not only because of the declining significance of reciprocity in IHL as
a legal concept, but also because of the asymmetric nature of many modem conflicts that involve non-state actors who hardly subscribe to basic
IHL principles. In such conflicts, adherence to the absolute prohibition
against torture by one party only-i.e., the state party-might, in fact,
disturb the military balance of powers between the parties to the conflict. 61

Punishment, G.A. Res. 57/199, U.N. Doc. A/RES/57/199 (Dec. 18, 2002). Still, it is questionable whether existing monitoring procedures are effective: their response is delayed,
their powers are generally of a recommendatory nature, and states most likely to engage in
torture are not subject to their jurisdiction.
64. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
65. In the words of the Israeli Supreme Court in the Public Committee Against Torture case: "This is the destiny of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and not
all practices employed by its enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often
fight with one hand tied behind its back .... Public Committee Against Torture,38 I.L.M. at
1488. President Barak also noted, however: "[A democracy] has the upper hand. Preserving the Rule of Law and recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
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This perception of lopsided application of the prohibition against torture in asymmetrical conflicts delegitimizes the absolute prohibition 66 and
renders adherence to it, especially in circumstances where the enemy is
demonized and even dehumanized, politically unpalatable. This explains
why states, such as the United States or Israel, have looked for ways to
evade the prohibition altogether: create legal Guantanamos where international conventions allegedly do not apply, 67 interpret in bad faith the
scope of the prohibition against torture and its terms of applicability, 68 let
others do the "dirty work" through a policy of renditions, 69 or lie about
resort to torture.7 ° While I cannot support any of these attempts to circumvent the prohibition against torture, their rate of recurrence is perhaps indicative of the counterproductiveness of normative overreaching:
an excessively broad absolute prohibition against torture might lead in
nonreciprocal conflict situations to less, not more, compliance with the
core prohibition.
The normative implications of the inability of the reciprocity rationale
to justify the absolute prohibition against torture in asymmetrical conflict
conditions are, arguably, that strict adherence to a broad absolute prohibition is particularly justified in international armed conflicts and noninternational armed conflicts, where there exists a reasonable expectation
that both parties to the conflict will "play it by the rules" (e.g., noninternational conflicts between organized armed groups governed by
Common Article 3 or Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, and comits strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties." Id. This adds a utilitarian element to
the aforementioned moral arguments supporting the absolute prohibition.
66. See, e.g., Gross, supra note 8, at 1512-13; cf Franck, supra note 48, at 735-51 (argu-

ing that incoherent application of norms undermines their legitimacy).
67.

See, e.g., Fleur Johns, Guantdnamo Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception, 16

EUR. J. INT'L L. 613 (2005).
68. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF DEF., WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE
INTERROGATIONS IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL,

HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 4-6 (2003), available at

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/nation/documents/040403dod.pdf;
Memorandum
from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Att'y Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep't of Justice, to
Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President (Aug. 1, 2002), in MARK DANNER,
TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR 115 (2005)

(discussing standards of conduct for interrogations under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A). For
analysis of these documents, see Josd E. Alvarez, Torturing the Law, 37 CASE W. RES. J.
INT'L L. 175, 179-98 (2006); Mary Ellen O'Connell, Affirming the Ban on Harsh Interrogation, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1231 (2005); Jonathan Canfield, Note, The Torture Memos: The Conflict between a Shift in U.S. Policy Towards a Condemnation of Human Rights and International ProhibitionsAgainst the Use of Torture, 33 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1049 (2005).
69. See, e.g., Joan Fitzpatrick, Rendition and Transfer in the War Against Terrorism:
Guant6namo and Beyond, 25 LOY. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 457 (2003); Leila Nadya
Sadat, Ghost Prisonersand Black Sites: ExtraordinaryRendition Under InternationalLaw,
37 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 309 (2006).

70.

See e.g., Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 602.
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mitted to observing basic IHL principles). In these cases, any military
advantage anticipated by the use of brutal interrogation measures against
enemy combatants or civilians is offset, in full or in part, by the parallel
restriction governing the conduct of the opposing party. By contrast, in
asymmetrical conflict circumstances, such as the "war on terror," weaker
policy rationales support the prohibition, and greater normative flexibility might be warranted.
Finally, it may be noted that some of the literature on the prohibition
against torture justifies the absolute nature of the prohibition by an additional and unique policy consideration- the ineffectiveness of torture. It
has sometimes been argued that torture in interrogations induces the
victim to provide information that she believes the interrogators seek,
regardless of its veracity.71 While this argument might hold true in criminal investigations, where interrogators might seek to obtain false confessions, it is rather unconvincing, in my mind, with relation to interrogation
in conflict or terror-related situations where the purpose of the interrogation is to obtain urgent and verifiable tactical information, with exclusive
military significance. For example, in the hypothetical "ticking time
bomb" situation, where interrogators have custody over an individual
who they believe knows the whereabouts of an imminent attack, it is difficult to accept that in the absence of alternative ways to foil the attack,
harsh interrogation techniques -putting aside their legality-would always be necessarily ineffective. While the unreliability of many pieces
of information procured by way of coercive interrogation techniques
could support the inadmissibility of such evidence in future criminal proceedings against the interrogated individual, given the high standard of
proof such proceedings require,73 the operational threshold for reliance
upon this information in desperate emergency situations cases may arguably be lower.
71.

See Ardi Imseis, 'Moderate' Torture on Trial: Critical Reflections on the Israeli

Supreme CourtJudgment Concerningthe Legality of the GeneralSecurity Service Interrogation Methods, 5 INT'L J. HUM. RTS. 71, 73 (2001); Koh, supra note 28, at 653; O'Connell,
supra note 68, at 1259; Philip N.S. Rumney, Is Coercive Interrogationof TerroristSuspects
Effective? A Response to Bagaric and Clarke, 40 U.S.F. L. REV. 479, 492 (2006); Press
Release, Senator John McCain, Statement of Senator John McCain Amendment on Army
Field Manual (July 25, 2005), available at http://mccain.senate.gov/press_office/
viewarticle.cfm?id=150 ("[T]orture and cruel treatment are ineffective methods, because
they induce prisoners to say what their interrogators want to hear, even if it is not
true....").
72. See, e.g., MARK BOWDEN, ROAD WORK: AMONG TYRANTS, HEROES, ROGUES,
AND BEASTS 107 (2004) (arguing that coercion is sometimes the clear choice of interrogation method).
73. See DERSHOWITZ, supra note 55, at 136-37; Marcy Strauss, Torture, 48 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 201, 217-26 (2004); see also A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't [2005]
UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (U.K.), paras. 68-72 (opinion of Nichols, L.).
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II. INTRODUCING SOME FLEXIBILITY INTO THE PROHIBITION AGAINST
CRUEL, INHUMAN, OR DEGRADING PUNISHMENT OR TREATMENT

Part One of the Article explored the policy rationales that may govern
the designation of IHL and IHR norms as absolute norms and assessed
their applicability with relation to the prohibition against torture. This
Part offers a legal model for implementing these policy considerations
within the framework of existing law. The model relies, in essence, on
the distinction introduced by CAT and the Ireland v. United Kingdom
European Court of Human Rights judgment between torture and other
forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment and punishment
(sometimes dubbed "degree two torture" or, rather distastefully, "torture-lite"). While I accept that both forms of mistreatment are always
impermissible under international law, there might be cases in which resort to harsh interrogation techniques falling short of torture might not
incur criminal responsibility. The proposed approach, which is compatible to some extent with the Israeli Supreme Court's judgment in Public
Committee Against Torture, thus introduces some degree of flexibility
into less severe forms of ill-treatment, while insisting, at the same time,
upon some degree of judicial oversight over the conduct of state agents in
this regard.
The Two Levels of the Prohibition
In Ireland v. United Kingdom, the European Court of Human Rights
examined whether the five techniques of interrogation applied by the
British military vis-A-vis terror suspects in Northern Ireland constituted
acts of torture prohibited by Article 3 of the European Human Rights
Convention.74 The majority answered the question in the negative:
Although the five techniques, as applied in combination, undoubtedly amounted to inhuman and degrading treatment, although their object was the extraction of confessions, the naming
of others and/or information and although they were used systematically, they did not occasion suffering of the particular intensity and cruelty implied by the word torture as so understood.75
Still, it noted that "[t]he [European] Convention prohibits in absolute
terms [both] torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment., 76 Hence, the practical implications of the distinction offered by
the court seemed to remain at the remedial level-the reputation costs
74. Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 41,65-66 (1978).
75. Id. at 67. For a previous decision that views torture as an aggravated form of illtreatment, see The Greek Case, 12 Y.B. Eur. Cony. on H.R. (Supp.) 1, 186 (Eur. Comm'n
on H.R. 1969).
76. Ireland,25 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 65; see also Ni Aoldin, supra note 6, at 214.
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associated with a finding that an act of torture took place by a state party
to the European Convention being more severe given the particular
stigma associated with the term; furthermore, the amount of financial
compensation due to the victim may be higher if torture, and not less
severe forms of maltreatment, was committed."
The legal implications of the distinction between torture and less severe
forms of ill-treatment were further spelled out in the 1984 CAT, in ways
which have direct relevance for the approach advocated in the present
Article. While a breach of the prohibition against torture, as defined in
Article 1 of CAT, entails a host of legal consequences-most importantly, a duty to extradite or prosecute (aut dederelautjudicare) perpetrators of torture found in the territory of any state party78-Article 16 specifies more limited obligations with relation to the "degree two" prohibition against other forms of cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.79
These limited consequences, also applicable to torture, include a duty to
prevent ill-treatment, to integrate the prohibition on ill-treatment into
education programs for officials and other persons handling detained
individuals, to systematically review interrogation and detention procedures, to investigate alleged violations, and to grant effective remedies to
victims of ill-treatment. 8° Notably, CAT does not require the criminal
prosecution of perpetrators of ill-treatment, nor does it bar derogation
from the prohibition against ill-treatment falling short of torture in times
of emergency."

77. Compare Rehbock v. Slovenia, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 191, 214-15 (determining
damages for inhuman treatment during the defendant's arrest at 25,000 deutsche marks
[currently approximately 13,000 euros] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage), with
Selmouni v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, 178, 188 (determining damages for torture
during a police interrogation at 500,000 French francs [currently approximately 76,000
euros] in compensation for non-pecuniary damage).
78. CAT, supra note 3, art. 7(1).
79. See id. art. 16.
80. Id. arts. 9-13, 16.
81. Note that CAT, Article 2(2), which does not govern the application of Article 16,
provides: "No exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked as a justification of torture." Id. art. 2(2). For a discussion of the scope of Article 2(2), see Ahcene
Boulesbaa, THE U.N. CONVENTION ON TORTURE AND THE PROSPECTS FOR
ENFORCEMENT 76-80 (1999).

Another area where practical differences may arise between torture and less severe
forms of ill-treatment is in the application of exclusionary rules of evidence. A v. Sec'y of
State for the Home Dep't [2005] UKHL 71, [2006] 2 A.C. 221 (U.K.), para. 53 (opinion of
Bingham, L.). The same rule would seem to apply before U.S. military commissions. See
Military Commissions Act of 2006 § 948r(b), 10 U.S.C.A. § 948r(b) (Westlaw through Pub.
L. No. 110-6).
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Is There an Exception to the ProhibitionAgainst Ill- Treatment?
The legal conclusion that CAT does not bar derogation from the prohibition against ill-treatment falling short of torture has been implicitly
accepted by the UN Committee Against Torture. In 1997, while reviewing Israel's report under CAT, the Committee criticized the Landau
Commission guidelines, which authorized the GSS to apply "'moderate
physical pressure"' in "ticking time bomb" circumstances and stated the
following:
The Committee acknowledges the terrible dilemma that Israel
confronts in dealing with terrorist threats to its security, but as a
State party to the Convention Israel is precluded from raising before this Committee exceptional circumstances as justification for
acts prohibited by article 1 of the Convention. This is plainly expressed in article 2 of the Convention.82
The Committee's position must be understood in the light of its earlier
statement that the seven interrogation techniques that the GSS applied
vis-A-vis Palestinian detainees amounted to torture, as defined in Article
1 of CAT. By implication, one can assume that had the measures in
question been classified as ill-treatment falling short of torture, Israel
would not have been barred by the "no derogation" rule found in Article
2 of CAT. So, one might have argued that in the absence of a specific
CAT provision on the matter, states could invoke the general defense of
necessity available to them under the law of state responsibility in order
to justify derogations from the prohibition against ill-treatment falling
short of torture.83
However, the proposition that states may invoke general international
law defenses in order to derogate from the prohibition against illtreatment falling short of torture does not reflect lex lata. This is because
Article 16(2) of CAT contains a "without prejudice" provision, which
preserves the continued application of torture and ill-treatment proscriptions found in other international or national law instruments, and such
instruments may introduce an absolute ban on all forms of proscribed illtreatment. 84 Indeed, Article 7 of the ICCPR, which encompasses both
82. United Nations, Comm. Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, para. 258, U.N. Doc. A/52/44 (Sept. 10, 1997).
83. See Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 25. While the text of draft Article 24 (distress) might also provide the state with a valid legal defense, the commentary to this Article suggests that it was not designed to cover general situations of emergency. Id. art. 24 &
cmt.1. It is interesting to note that early drafts of CAT, Article 2-the nonderogation
clause-also covered the prohibition on cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment. J. HERMAN BURGERS & HANS DANELIUS, THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION
AGAINST TORTURE: A HANDBOOK ON THE CONVENTION AGAINST TORTURE AND

OTHER CRUEL, INHUMAN OR DEGRADING TREATMENT OR PUNISHMENT 47-49 (1988).

84.

CAT, supra note 3, art. 16(2).
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the prohibition against torture and cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment, is among the nonderogable provisions of CAT, and
thus continues to apply in times of emergency." Several authorities have
even viewed Article 7, in its entirety, as reflective of jus cogens-a legal
status that would seem to block the application of general defenses under
the laws of state responsibility by virtue of Article 26 of the International
Law Commission (ILC) Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for InternationallyWrongful Acts. 7
In addition, absolute prohibitions against ill-treatment (or brutal
treatment) can be found under Common Article 3 of the four Geneva
Conventions, as well as under Article 17 of Geneva III, Article 32 of Geneva IV, Article 75 of the First Additional Protocol, and Article 4 of the
Second Additional Protocol. Significantly, the mainstream view in the
legal literature appears to be that the general defense of necessity under
the laws of state responsibility is inapplicable to obligations under IHL,
as that body of law constitutes a nonderogable specific legal regime particularly designed to govern emergency situations.88
85. See General Comment 20, supra note 26, para. 3 ("The text of article 7 allows of no
limitation. The Committee also reaffirms that, even in situations of public emergency such
as those referred to in article 4 of the Covenant, no derogation from the provision of article 7 is allowed and its provisions must remain in force."); cf. Aksoy v. Turkey, 1996-VI
Eur. Ct. H.R. 2260, 2278 ("Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight
against organised terrorism and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture
or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.").
86. See United Nations, Human Rights Comm., General Comment 24 (52): General
Comment on Issues Relating to Reservations Made Upon Ratification or Accession to the
Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in Relation to DeclarationsUnderArticle 41
of the Covenant, para. 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6 (Nov. 11, 1994); RODLEY,
supra note 6, at 54; see also Geert-Jan G.J. Knoops, DEFENSES IN CONTEMPORARY
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAw 29-30 (2001); Michael Byers, Conceptualising the Relationship Between Jus Cogens and Erga Omnes Rules, 66 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 211, 213-15
(1997). But see Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 40 cmt. 5 (specifying only Article 1 of
CAT as reflective of jus cogens); LAURI HANNIKAINEN, PEREMPTORY NORMS (Jus
COGENS) IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 509 (1988) ("[I]t would appear d fortiori that the prohibition of 'inhuman' treatment or punishment cannot as such be a peremptory norm in
contemporary international law.").
87. Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 26 ("Nothing in this chapter precludes the
wrongfulness of any act of a State which is not in conformity with an obligation arising
under a peremptory norm of general international law.").
88.

THEODOR

MERON,

HUMAN

RIGHTS

AND

HUMANITARIAN

NORMS

AS

CUSTOMARY LAw 215-17 (1989). The nonderogable nature of IHL is demonstrated by
provisions such as Geneva III, Articles 6, 7, and 131, and Geneva IV, Articles 7, 8, and 148.
See Geneva IV, supra note 2, arts. 7, 8, 148; Geneva III, supra note 3, arts. 6, 7, 131. This
seems to exclude the applicability of the general law of state responsibility. See Draft
Articles, supra note 17, art. 55 ("These articles do not apply where and to the extent that
the conditions for the existence of an internationally wrongful act or the content or implementation of the international responsibility of a State are governed by special rules of
international law."); see also id. art. 25(2) ("[N]ecessity may not be invoked by a State as a
ground for precluding wrongfulness if: (a) The international obligation in question ex-
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As a result, it would seem that under existing international law, states
cannot refer to any prevailing emergency conditions in order to justify
torture or any other form of "cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment
or treatment" - at least not in circumstances governed by ICCPR or regional human rights treaties 9 (i.e., vis-A-vis individuals subject to the jurisdiction of the state party in question) or IHL instruments (i.e., in times
of conflict). Still, customary international law would probably support
the proposition that even states that are not parties to some of the relevant instruments are bound to respect the absolute nature of the prohibition against torture and other forms of ill-treatment. 90 This legal conclusion sits well with the moral and policy considerations identified in Part
One: the importance of the humanitarian values protected by the prohibition against torture and other forms of ill-treatment justifies, in the absence of credible and effective judicial monitoring, an absolute ban that
would not be open for abuse.
Alan Dershowitz's proposal to authorize domestic judges to issue "torture warrants"9' is thus incompatible with lex lata and the legitimate political choice it represents. Furthermore, his position is also faulty from a
legal policy perspective: although Dershowitz's proposal is based upon
the position shared by the present author that relativizing the absolute
prohibition necessitates improved institutional oversight, the new balance
he offers seems inadequate. Dershowitz largely glosses over the classical
cludes the possibility of invoking necessity...."). This conclusion can also be supported by
policy considerations: although one could make, in theory, the argument that a distinction
should be made between "justification" and "excuse" -i.e., between lawful conduct incompatible with the primary norm in question and unlawful conduct without legal consequence-the introduction of such a distinction into IHL might seriously undermine its
effectiveness, and thus seems undesirable. See, e.g., ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAw 219-20 (2003). Indeed, the ILC commentary seems to reject the applicability of the necessity defense to IHL. See Draft Articles, supra note 17, art. 25 cmt. 19
("[Clertain humanitarian conventions applicable to armed conflict expressly exclude reliance on military necessity. Others while not explicitly excluding necessity are intended to
apply in abnormal situations of peril for the responsible State and plainly engage its essential interests. In such a case the non-availability of the plea of necessity emerges clearly
from the object and the purpose of the rule."). Interestingly enough, the ICJ left open, in a
recent opinion, the question of the relations between the necessity defense and IHL and
IHR law. See Legal Consequences of Construction of Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion (July 9, 2004), 43 I.L.M. 1009, 1050 ("Since those treaties already
address considerations of this kind within their own provisions, it might be asked whether
a state of necessity as recognized in customary international law could be invoked with
regard to those treaties as a ground for precluding the wrongfulness of the measures or
decisions being challenged. However, the Court will not need to consider that question.").
89. I/A CHR, supra note 15, art. 5; see Inter-American Convention to Prevent and
Punish Torture art. 1, Dec. 9, 1985, O.A.S. T.S. No. 67; African (Banjul) Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights art. 5, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58; ECHR, supra note 6, art. 3.
90. RODLEY, supra note 6, at 66-67.
91. DERSHOWITZ, supra note 55, at 158-63.
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quis custodiet ipsos custodesn (who will guard the guards) problem and
confers upon domestic judges sensitive monitoring powers notwithstanding the unsatisfactory record of domestic courts in and outside the United
States in protecting the basic human rights of enemy combatants in times
of conflict. Thus, reasonable fears persist that "torture warrants" too
would lead to normative abuse.93
An alternative proposal fleshed out by a 2004 long-term strategy report
composed by an expert group chaired by two other Harvard professorsPhilip Heymann and Juliette Kayyem 9 - also seems to be flawed from an
international law perspective. While the report calls for renunciation of
torture, as defined in Article 1 of CAT, under all circumstances, it concedes that the prohibition against ill-treatment in Article 16 of CAT may
be deviated from in extreme cases.95 Furthermore, unlike Dershowitz's
plan to invest the judiciary with powers of review over application of the
exception to the rule, the long-term strategy report recommends that the
President herself authorize exceptional interrogation measures, and that
the decision shall be subject to congressional oversight. 96 But again, the
significantly less than perfect record of the U.S. administration in upholding international law restrictions in extreme circumstances (which is unfortunately characteristic of the record of many other governments as
well), and the limited effectiveness of congressional supervision, seem to
offer inadequate guarantees against abuse of the relative standard advocated in the report.
So, positive law seems to reject the introduction of flexible elements to
the prohibition against torture and other forms of ill-treatment at the
state level. Still, a different legal outcome may be possible, at the individual responsibility level, with relation to exceptions to criminal liabil-

92. See John C. Yoo, Judicial Review and the War on Terrorism, 72 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 427, 440 (2003) ("Recent cases in the war against al Qaeda suggest that courts are
following a deferential approach which ... attempts to accommodate the imperatives of
the war-fighting system so that effective means can be employed to combat al Qaeda at
home."); Gross, supra note 8, at 1538-39; Raviv, supra note 53, at 170-71.
93. Other scholars offer objections to Dershowitz's position. See Gross, supra note 8,
at 1534-53 (noting, inter alia, fears of a spillover to other emergency powers, compromising
the image of the judiciary, and conferring legitimacy upon acts of torture); Seth F.
Kreimer, Too Close to the Rack and the Screw: ConstitutionalConstraintson Torture in the
War on Terror,6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 278, 322-24 (2003) (citing, inter alia, fears of institutionalizing torture); Raviv, supra note 53, at 163-64 (criticizing the uncertainty of ex ante
warrants and questioning Dershowitz's distinction between convicted and unconvicted
terrorists for the purpose of permitting "torture warrants"); see also Elaine Scarry, Five
Errors in the Reasoning of Alan Dershowitz, in TORTURE, supra note 6, at 281,286-87.
94.

HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 61.

95.

See id. at 32.

96. Id. at 25-26.
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ity.97 Furthermore, the legal model discussed below-i.e., banning all
forms of torture and ill-treatment but exercising ex post judicial control
over the criminal law consequences of harsh investigation techniques
falling short of torture -arguably offers less room for abuse. Thus, it
seems to represent a better policy course.
A Criminal Law Exception to Torture?
As was already noted, the duty to extradite or prosecute perpetrators
of torture under Article 7 of CAT does not encompass violations of Article 16, which prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment."98 Still, such proceedings, although not required by CAT, are
mandated by IHL: Article 130 of Geneva III and Article 147 of Geneva
IV require states to extradite or prosecute persons who have applied inhuman treatment vis-A-vis protected persons (POWs or protected civilians). 9 Furthermore, the Rome Statute criminalizes inhuman or degrading treatment taking place in both international and non-international
armed conflicts1°° (however, the Rome Statute does not directly require
state parties to prosecute individuals who committed crimes defined by
the statute).
Can individuals accused of ill-treatment falling short of torture plead
under existing international criminal law "exceptional circumstances"
defenses against the incurring of criminal liability, notwithstanding the
absolute duty of states to refrain from engaging in torture or other forms
of ill-treatment? In its Public Committee Against Torture decision, the
Israeli Supreme Court suggested that the necessity defense remained
available in criminal trials of individuals accused of committing torture:
"We are prepared to assume ... the 'necessity' defence is open to all,
particularly an investigator, acting in101an organizational capacity of the
State in interrogations of that nature.
97. See Paola Gaeta, May Necessity Be Available as a Defence for Torture in the Interrogationof Suspected Terrorists?,2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 785,789-90 (2004).
98. CAT, supra note 3, art. 16.
99. Geneva IV, supra note 2, arts. 146-47; Geneva III, supra note 3, arts. 129-30.
100. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 8(2)(a)(ii), (c)(ii). It may be noted that a criminal prohibition on inhuman treatment may also derive from Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome
Statute, which designates as crimes against humanity: "[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or
physical health." Id. art. 7(1)(k). However, the requirement that the act in question
should entail "great suffering" or "serious injury," would probably mean that it falls within
the definition of torture in Article 1 of CAT, and the prohibition against torture as a crime
against humanity found in the Rome Statute. Id. art. 7(1)(f); CAT, supra note 3, art. 1.
Hence, it cannot control the status under international criminal law of the prohibition of
other forms of ill-treatment falling short of torture.
101. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. Israel [1999] IsrSC 53(4) 817,
reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1471, 1485 (1999). It is perhaps interesting to note that Vice President Cheshin alluded to this method of ex post facto relativity in the Adalah case. HCJ
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This position has some notable advantages from a policy-oriented perspective: it introduces a degree of flexibility into the prohibition, without
renouncing the moral basis upon which it may be founded-i.e., that any
application of torture or other forms of ill-treatment is always contra
legem (though not necessarily giving rise to criminal guilt).' °2 Furthermore, the criminal law litigation framework introduces a judicial monitoring element, which could limit the risk of abuse of the exception by state
agents (in the alternative, quasi-judicial prosecutorial powers of oversight
are employed in the context of a prosecutorial decision whether or not to
press charges).' 3 Although domestic courts and prosecutors tend to underprotect the rights of enemy combatants, this deficiency is somewhat
offset by the conduct-guiding effect of maintaining the absolute prohibition, 1 4 and, more importantly, by the "chilling effect" generated by the ex
post nature of the legal exemption. 5 Indeed, whereas until 1999, Israeli
GSS interrogators conducted harsh interrogations with a sense of impunity, their conduct subsequent to the Public Committee Against Torture
judgment seems to have become more temperate by reason of the fear
that they personally might face prosecution and criminal conviction if a
prosecutor or a court of law were to conclude that they misapplied the
necessity defense.'0
3799/02 Adalah-The Legal Ctr. for Arab Minority Rights in Isr. v. GOC Cent. Command,
IDF [2005] IsrSC 56(5) 393, reprinted in 45 LL.M. 491, 500 (2006) (Cheshin, Vice President, concurring).
102. Gross, supra note 8, at 1504; cf. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 608 ("The finding that
'torture' was committed constitutes a moral condemnation which in the international
sphere is a relatively meaningful sanction.").
103. Cf Koh, supra note 28, at 659-60 (hypothesizing that if the President were to
authorize torture, prosecutors would have to decide whether to prosecute her or not). Such
oversight procedure would be particularly effective if "acoustic separation" between the
investigators and the prosecutors or judges were to be maintained. See Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L.
REV. 625, 630-34 (1984).
104. See Emanuel Gross, Legal Aspects of Tackling Terrorism: The Balance Between
the Right of a Democracy to Defend Itself and the Protection of Human Rights, 6 UCLA J.
INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 89, 112 (2001).
105. See Sanford H. Kadish, Torture, the State and the Individual,23 ISR. L. REV. 345,
355 (1989) ("Would not the burden on the official be so great that it would require circumstances of a perfectly extraordinary character to induce the individual to take the risk of
acting? The answer is of course yes, that's the point."); Raviv, supra note 53, at 166-70.
106. See BOWDEN, supra note 72, at 109 (describing how Israeli NGOs and others
acknowledge greater restraint on the part of Israeli GSS interrogators following the 1999
judgment); Joseph Lelyveld, Interrogating Ourselves, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 2005, § 6
(Magazine), at 36,40.
Benvenisti also notes that application of general criminal law defenses to an incidence
of ill-treatment would subject exceptional situations in which ill-treatment is contemplated
to the constraining doctrines that have been developed in other circumstances governed by
criminal law. Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 609. Dershowitz argues, however, that the ex
post nature of the necessity defense exposes interrogators to an unacceptable risk of
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One should also note that any criminal law exception does not release
the state from its obligations under IHL and IHR law to make reparations for violating the international standard.'o The prospect of civil
remedies that might be pursued by the victim of ill-treatment, and the
other international responsibility and consequences incurred by the state
serve as additional mitigating factors that would limit the risk of abuse of
the criminal law exception.
Still, to the degree that the Public Committee Against Torture decision
permitted the raising of the necessity exception as a defense against "degree one" torture, it seems to have fallen short of the requirements of
CAT. This is because Article 7, which introduces a duty to extradite or
prosecute, is subject to the language of Article 2, which prevents the invocation of necessity as a justification to torture.ln However, as was already noted, Article 2 does not govern criminal proceedings that might
take place for violation of Article 16 (CAT does not even oblige states to
extradite or prosecute in these circumstances), and to the degree that the
Public Committee Against Torture decision authorized the invocation of
the criminal necessity defense in relation to ill-treatment falling short of
torture, it remains compatible with CAT.'0
One should, however, explore the compatibility of the Public Committee Against Torture decision with other possible sources for an absolute
obligation to extradite or prosecute. The "grave breaches" provisions of
the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I, which introduce a
criminal prohibition of ill-treatment, do not address directly the question
of what, if any, general defenses under criminal law might be available." °
Notably, these provisions do not encompass crimes perpetrated in nonprosecution in close

cases. ALAN
A TURBULENT AGE 477 (2002).

107.

M. DERSHOWITZ,

SHOUTING FIRE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN

Katharine Shirey, The Duty to Compensate Victims of Torture under Customary

InternationalLaw, 14 INT'L LEGAL PERSP. 30,30 (2004).

108. CAT, supra note 3, arts. 2, 7. Note that whereas Article 2(1) of CAT is directed
only to states, Article 2(2), which bars the raising of necessity defense claims, is not limited
in the same manner. Id. art. 2. Hence, it would seem to bar the raising of claims on behalf
of states and individuals. This latter conclusion is confirmed by the text of Article 2(3),
which deals with the superior responsibility defense -a defense that only applies at the
criminal law level. Id. For explicit criticism of the Israeli Supreme Court's judgment on
the availability of the necessity defense in torture cases, see United Nations, Comm.
Against Torture, Report of the Committee Against Torture, para. 52, U.N. Doc. A157/44
(May 17,2002).
109. But see General Comment 20, supra note 26, para. 3 ("The Committee likewise
observes that no justification or extenuating circumstances may be invoked to excuse a
violation of article 7 for any reasons, including those based on an order from a superior
officer or public authority.").
110. See Geneva IV, supra note 2, arts. 146-47; Geneva III, supra note 3, arts. 129-30;
see also Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 85(4)(c) (covering inhuman and degrading practices
based on racial discrimination).
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international armed conflicts (with the exception of wars of national liberation, which are considered international armed conflicts for state parties to the Additional Protocol I; but given the controversy surrounding
Article 1(4) of Additional Protocol I, non-state parties, such as the
United States or Israel, are most probably not bound by its provisions)."1
Since IHL does not obligate states to extradite or prosecute perpetrators
of ill-treatment perpetrated in the context of non-international armed
conflicts, a state that would be willing to consider the availability of general criminal defenses in national court cases addressing such acts, in a
manner not incompatible with the language of CAT, would probably be
acting within its right.
Furthermore, even the absolute nature of the duty to extradite or
prosecute perpetrators of ill-treatment perpetrated in the context of international armed conflicts is questionable. Although a "Nurembergtype" teleological interpretation argument could have been made that an
"extreme circumstances" defense is incompatible with the very nature of
IHL1-a code of conduct that should apply particularly in emergency
situations-such a position would seem to contradict Article 31(1) of the
Rome Statute, which provides the following "self-defense" exception:
[A] person shall not be criminally responsible if, at the time of
that person's conduct ....
•.. The person acts reasonably to defend himself or herself or
another person or, in the case of war crimes, property which is essential for the survival of the person or another person or property which is essential for accomplishing a military mission,
against an imminent and unlawful use of force in a manner proportionate to the degree of13danger to the person or the other person or property protected.'
In a similar vein, Article 31(1)(d) of the Rome Statute introduces a defense of duress resulting "from a threat of imminent death or of continuing or imminent serious bodily harm against" the perpetrator or another
person.114
111. Protocol I, supra note 13, art. 1(4); Michael J. Matheson, Deputy Legal Adviser,
U.S. Dep't of State, The United States Position on the Relation of Customary International Law to the 1977 Protocols Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, Remarks at
the Sixth Annual American Red Cross-Washington College of Law Conference on International Humanitarian Law (Jan. 22, 1987), in 2 AM U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 419, 425 (1987).
112. Cf. The Nurnberg Trial, 6 F.R.D. 69, 110 (Int'l Military Trib. 1946) (supporting
the interpretation of international conventions leading to the imposition of individual
criminal responsibility).
113. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 31(1).
114. Id. art. 31(1)(d). There is some confusion whether the difference between duress
and necessity relates to the imminence of the threat or to the source of the threat (compulsion by a third person or other circumstances, including forces of nature). See, e.g., Prose-
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Thus, although the Rome Statute defines some forms of ill-treatment as
war crimes in both international and non-international armed conflicts, it
suggests that in extraordinary circumstances, self-defense, necessity, or
duress legal exceptions might be available to persons charged with international crimes.11 Furthermore, the Rome Statute does not prohibit reliance upon defenses that derive from national laws, if they were to become accepted as general principles of law (and provided that they are
not incompatible with international law). Arguably, national criminal
law defenses such as duress, necessity, and self-defense might meet these
requirements.1 16
While the burden of actually proving the strict conditions underlying
the criminal "exceptional circumstances" defenses recognized by the
Rome Statute
might be rather
high,
treamentrelaed
•
117 and probably unattainable in most illtreatment-related prosecutions, the Rome Statute still serves as a powerful indicator that some relativity exists in international criminal law
governing crimes of ill-treatment falling short of torture. Moreover, even
cutor v. Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, Judgment, 66 (Oct. 7, 1997) (McDonald &
Vohrah, JJ., joint separate opinion); id. 14 (Cassese, J., separate and dissenting opinion).
115. See CASSESE, supra note 88, at 251; Albin Eser, Article 31: Groundsfor Excluding
Criminal Responsibility,

in

COMMENTARY

ON

THE

ROME

STATUTE

OF

THE

INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 537, 550-51 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999). Note that the
court is ultimately authorized to determine the applicability of the available defenses to the
cases at hand. Rome Statute, supra note 18, art. 31(2); see Per Saland, International Criminal Law Principles, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE
ROME STATUTE-ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 189, 208-09 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).

The availability of "exceptional circumstance" defenses to war crimes is also confirmed by
some judicial opinions. See, e.g., Erdemovic, Case No. IT-96-22-A, 1 19-29 (Cassese, J.,
separate and dissenting opinion) (discussing the availability of the defense of duress in postWorld War II cases). Still, other decisions opposing the availability of "exceptional circumstance" defenses can also be identified. See, e.g., id. 19 (opinion of the court) ("[D]uress
does not afford a complete defence to a soldier charged with a crime against humanity
and/or a war crime involving the killing of innocent human beings.").
A leading Israeli criminal law expert has argued that, in cases of torture, the only criminal defense that should be made available is self-defense, and even then, only when the
torture victim has herself created the risk underlying the defensive act. Miriam Gur-Arye,
Can the War Against Terror Justify the Use of Force in Interrogations? Reflections in Light
of the Israeli Experience, in TORTURE, supra note 6, at 183, 191-95.
116. Rome Statute, supra note 18, arts. 21(1)(c), 31(3); see also Criminal Justice Act,
1988, c. 33, § 134(4) (Eng.) ("It shall be a defence for a person charged with an offence
under this section [i.e., torture] in respect of any conduct of his to prove that he had lawful
authority, justification or excuse for that conduct."). Benvenisti argues that self-defense
might "be considered a 'general principle of law' [under] Article 38(1)(c) of the Statute of
the International Court of Justice." Benvenisti, supra note 8, at 607. But see Belgium's
Amendment to the Law of June 15, 1993 Concerning the Punishment of Grave Breaches
of Humanitarian Law art. 12, Aug. 7, 2003, 42 I.L.M. 1258 ("[N]o necessity of a political,
military, or national nature can justify the offenses defined in Articles 136bis, ter, quater,
sexies, and septies, even when they have been committed by way of reprisal.").
117. See Gaeta, supra note 97, at 791-92 (arguing that realistically, the conditions for
necessity would not be met in torture-related interrogations).
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if the relative conditions underlying the available "exceptional circumstance" defenses were not to be fully met, the existence of exceptional
conditions might
be viewed as a mitigating factor in sentencing the guilty
118
perpetrator.
A final observation on the absolute or relative nature of the criminal
norm against ill-treatment pertains to the alleged jus cogens nature of
that norm, and the effect that this might have upon the availability of
criminal law defenses. To my mind, the classification of the prohibition
against torture and other forms of ill-treatment as jus cogens does not
dictate the nature of the criminal prohibition designed to punish norm
violators. This is because the peremptory nature of the primary norm
against torture and other forms of ill-treatment does not carry over
automatically, without clear indication in state practice and treaty language, to the host of derivative norms designed to promote compliance
with the primary norm (attribution of criminal responsibility, possible
limitations on personal immunity and state immunity, duty to make reparations, etc.).119 Hence, it is unlikely that in the absence of a clear duty
under international law to even prosecute individuals responsible for illtreatment short of torture (in circumstances other than an international
armed conflict), it would be possible to maintain that the introduction of
normative flexibility in the course of criminal prosecutions violates jus
cogens norms. Moreover, even if there is a jus cogens obligation to
prosecute, one should require solid evidence in state practice and opinion
juris that no defenses may be raised, as jus cogens norms are not necessarily absolute norms.120
III. CONCLUSION
This Article reviewed the desirability and scope of coverage of the absolute prohibition against torture and other forms of "cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment or punishment.' 2' It argued that a link should be
established between these two levels of the legal debate: the degree of
118. See id. at 793; see also BURGERS & DANELIUS, supra note 83, at 124 (stating that a
superior order cannot serve as a defense against torture, but as a mitigating factor in sentencing).
119. See, e.g., A1-Adsani v. United Kingdom, 2001-XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 79, 101-02; Arrest
Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Dem. Rep. Congo v. Beig.), paras. 58-59 (Judgment) (Feb. 14,
2002), available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iCOBE/icobejudgment/icobe-i
judgment 20020214.pdf; Regina v. Bartle, [2000] 1 A.C. 147 (H.L. 1999), reprinted in 38
I.L.M. 581, 622 (1999) (Hope, L.J.). But see id. at 593 (Browne-Wilkinson, L.J.); id. at 649
(Saville, L.J.) (stating that acts contrary to jus cogens exclude head of state immunity).
120. See Gaeta, supra note 97, at 790 (concluding that jus cogens norms do not negate
criminal law defenses designed to protect important systemic values, and, potentially, other
jus cogens norms). But see MERON, supra note 88, at 222 (determining that jus cogens
norms merit absolute protection).
121. CAT, supra note 3, art. 16.
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flexibility that could or should be introduced into the prohibition against
torture must be informed by the moral and policy considerations that
may justify the absolute nature of the prohibition in the first place.
I have posited that the categorical moral imperative for an absolute
prohibition on torture and other forms of ill-treatment remains unsubstantiated, given the problem of addressing an "extreme case" where violating the rights of one individual may be necessary for protecting the
rights of many others. Hence, the key to understanding the absolute nature of the prohibition should be found in the realm of second-order institutional considerations: because of the risk of chronic norm abuse, absolute IHL and IHR norms promote better enforcement of humanitarian
norms at the price of suboptimal compatibility in extreme cases. So, the
important moral values protected by the prohibition against torture, together with institutional constraints and the improbable occurrence of
exceptional "ticking bomb" interrogation situations, which might justify
torture, militate in favor of resorting to an absolute prohibition even the
cost of generating a poor match between law and reality in extreme cases.
This policy analysis supports the distinction offered by the European
Court of Human Rights in Ireland v. United Kingdom, and subsequently
incorporated into CAT, between torture and other forms of cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment and punishment, as both the moral arguments and the institutional considerations apply with weaker force with
relation to the less grave forms of ill-treatment. Hence, a greater degree
of flexibility may appertain to this normative category, especially if accompanied by improved monitoring, which could reduce the risk of normative abuse that might be associated with the application of any relative
balancing test. Furthermore, it had been argued that an excessively rigid
standard would attract limited compliance and might induce states, such
as the United States or Israel, to look for ways to evade the prohibition
against torture altogether. In short, more might actually mean less.
The second part of the Article explored the possibility of accommodating these policy insights within the framework of existing international
law on the prohibition against torture. Here, another distinction between
exceptions to state responsibility and criminal law defenses was offered.
Whereas the ICCPR and the Geneva Conventions bar the possibility of
derogating from either the prohibition against torture or the prohibition
against other forms of ill-treatment, the duty to prosecute violators of the
prohibition found in CAT and the Geneva Conventions has partial coverage: CAT does not introduce a duty to prosecute individuals responsible for ill-treatment short of torture, and the Geneva Conventions do not
require such prosecution for crimes perpetrated in non-international
armed conflict. Furthermore, the Rome Statute suggests that a defense
of necessity would also be available to persons accused in committing war
crimes in the context of both international and non-international armed
conflicts.
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The review of law, policy, and morality thus suggests that there is only
limited room for relativizing the absolute prohibition against torture under existing law. Among the concrete proposals to introduce flexibility
into the prohibition, it seems that only the Israeli solution of confirming
the unlawfulness of all forms of ill-treatment while reserving the ability of
violators to plead the necessity defense might conform to existing international law, provided that it does not apply to crimes of torture.
While this solution might strike some as too modest and oblivious to
many aspects of the moral dilemma presented in "ticking time bomb"
and other catastrophic scenarios, it reflects the modest ambitions of this
Article -a critical analysis of existing law on the matter. The imperfectness of existing law inevitably reflects upon the imperfectness of the solution offered by the present author.

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 56:837

